Ensuring compliance of organizations to federal regulations is a growing concern. This paper presents a framework and methods to verify whether an implemented low-level security policy is compliant to a high-level security policy. Our compliance checking framework is based on organizational and security metadata to support refinement of high-level concepts to implementation specific instances. Our work uses the results of refinement calculus to express valid refinement patterns and their properties. Intuitively, a low-level security policy is compliant to a high-level security policy if there is a valid refinement path from the high-level security policy to the low-level security policy. Our model is capable of detecting violations of security policies, failures to meet obligations, and capability and modal conflicts.
I. INTRODUCTION

R
ECENT regulations, like Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) [1] and Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [2] , are having a broad impact in information technology (IT) operations at many organizations. For example, SOX requires organizations to place adequate internal controls over financial reporting. HIPAA requires sufficient safeguards to be placed for controlling access to medical records. Moreover, these regulations require evaluations of safeguards and controls implemented by the organizations to determine whether they are compliant with the requirements.
Tools to support automated compliance checking and establish formal properties are needed. Clearly, this is a complex problem requiring knowledge not only about the high-and low-level policies but also the available technologies, organizational requirements and processes, and system dynamics. Several policy languages [3] - [6] have been proposed by researchers. However, they were not designed to allow comparison of high-level and low-level security policies.
In this paper, we focus on the specific problem of checking compliance of an implemented security policy to the high-level security policy of an organization. A high-level security policy may specify 1) description of security requirements over abstract concepts, and 2) obligations, dispensations, and permissions. The low-level security policy gives specific security requirements over instances of abstract concepts. For example, let us consider an organization with a business process called Order Management. A rule in high-level policy may be that the Business Manager must protect the Order Management process from unauthorized access. Rules in low-level security policy may specify access control list for the purchase orders database used by the Order Management process. Refinement of a high-level policy into a low-level policy may require instantiation of roles, refinement of actions, and inference procedures. Many researchers have also proposed mechanisms for policy refinement [7] - [9] , i.e. to derive the low-level enforceable policies from the high-level policies. Instantiation of roles has been studied extensively in context of access control [10] . The work of Backes et al. [11] focuses on comparing two privacy policies. However, the problem of verifying compliance of a lowlevel implemented policy to a high-level policy is not fully considered yet. In this paper, we propose a mechanism based on refinement calculus [12] to fill this gap.
In this work, we propose a policy refinement framework and action algebra that we apply for checking compliance of security policies. The proposed action algebra forms the basis of action refinements. To illustrate the need of action refinement to study compliance checking we now present an example. Let a 1 , a 2 , and a 3 be actions, s a subject, and o an object. Assume that allowing action a 1 is equivalent to allowing action a 2 and disallowing action a 3 . If a high-level policy contains an access control rule (s, o, +a 1 ) and low-level policy contains access control rules (s, o, +a 2 ) and (s, o, +a 3 ) then the low level policy is not compliant to the high-level policy. Intuitively, the policy compliance problem asks the question whether the low-level policy satisfies the relevant requirements of the high-level security policy.
Our main contributions in this paper are development of an action algebra, a framework for policy refinement using refinement pattern, and a definition of compliance based on the concept of model checking. We describe a policy language that can model both high-level and low-level security policies. The proposed policy language is an extension of the Authorization Specification Language (ASL) and Flexible Authorization Framework(FAF) [5] . The extended language supports specification of obligations, dispensations, and authorizations. We have applied the principles of refinement calculus to security policies, and developed an action algebra that can be used to evaluate the correctness of action compositions. In addition, we have developed a policy refinement mechanism that combines action algebra and the policy language to refine high-level security policy into low-level security policies. Security policies are refined using action refinement patterns and derivation rules. The refinement process results in a set of possible low-level policies and corresponding system states. If the implemented low-level policy and the current system state corresponds to a derived low-level policy and state then we consider the implemented policy to be compliant to the high-level policy.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II presents an overview of the proposed compliance checking framework. Section III presents definitions of basic constructs. Section IV describes action composition. Section V and VI describe our extension of Flexible Authorization Framework(FAF) and the compliance checking process respectively. In Section VII we conclude and recommend future work.
II. COMPLIANCE CHECKING FRAMEWORK
We propose a compliance-checking framework, where all entities in the concerned organization are described with ontological concepts. We define an ontology that models concepts like, subjects, permissions, obligations, actions, protection objects, and metadata associated with them and with the organization. Our compliance checking framework comprises of the following components: 1. an ontology, 2. instances of ontology concepts (e.g., users, organization's resources, roles, etc.), 3. a high-level security policy, 4. a set of low-level security policies, 5. refinement patterns, and 6. compliance checking engine. An overview of the compliance checking framework is shown in Figure 1(a) . We now describe the components of the proposed compliance checking framework.
We model security policies as locally stratified logic programs similar to Authorization Specification Language [5] . The security policy language presented in this work can represent obligation, dispensations, and authorizations. It also supports conflict resolution rules and policy refinement. Action refinement patterns specify refinement of an action of type A into a composition expression (Section IV) formed with sub-actions of A such that the constraints for satisfying any obligation of type A are preserved.
The compliance checking engine in our framework refines the high-level security policy by recursively applying policy refinement rules. The refinement process continues until no new facts can be derived. The refined policies generated by this process comprise of ground rules and system-state information (facts) only. The set of all decision rules in a policy is called a decision view.
The low-level security policy and system information given as input to check for compliance is now compared with the set of refined security policies generated. If the given system state satisfies post conditions of applicable obligations and the decision view of input low-level policy implies one of the possible decision views of high-level policy, we say that the given system complies to high-level policy. However, if the given system is not compliant, the compliance checking engine may also detect violations of high-level policy and capability conflicts that prevent users from performing their obligations.
In Section VI, we discuss different types of violations and capability conflicts in further detail. Rules in high-level policy contain composite actions. Composite action consists of two or more subactions. We present an action composition algebra and Ontology based system model to check whether the action compositions are well-formed.
In next section, we define constructs used to model system state and policy components like actions.
III. DEFINITIONS This work uses ontologies to model the entities of our compliance checking framework. Our method relies on this ontology to aid the compliance checking as described in following sections. We now present our definition on Ontology used in this work.
Definition 3.1: (Ontology) An ontology O is a 6-tuple (C, P, C h , P h , dom, range), where C is a set of classes, P is a set of properties, C h is the subclass hierarchy of C and P h is the subproperty hierarchy of P. dom and range are functions defined as dom : P → P (C) and range : P → P (C), where P (C) represents the power set of C. Let c ∈ C be a class such that c ∈ dom(p i ) for i = 1, . . . , k and let r i represent the range(p i ) for i = 1, . . . , k. We represent the class c as c ((p 1 , r 1 ) , . . . , (p k , r k )).
Example 3.1: Let Computer be a class with properties os, owner, and name. Let the range of property os be given by the class OS, the range of property owner be given by the class Agent, and the range of property name be given by the class String. The class Computer is represented as Computer((os,{OS}),(owner,{Agent}),(name,{String})).
Figure 1(b) shows class hierarchy of the concepts used in our framework. Our ontology is an extension of the SUMO ontology [13] being developed by the IEEE SUO Working Group. The root node of our ontology is the class Entity. The class Entity refers to the fundamental concept in the domain being modeled. The class Object refers to physical objects. Binary relations that evaluates to true or false are represented by class Predicate. Process is a class of active components that occur and have temporal parts or stages. The class Agent represents something or someone that can act on its own. For example, software agents and human users. Human agents are represented by the class Users. A set of users is called a Group. A social position that is usually associated with some obligations and permissions is called a Role. The class Action represents a set of operations that the users may perform. Properties of the class Action are shown in Table I . Definition 3.2: (Object) Let O be an ontology. An object is an instance of any class c defined in O. Let c ((p 1 , r 1 ) , . . . , (p k , r k )) Definition 3.4: (State) The state of a data system DS is described by properties of objects in DS, that is {p
For simplicity, in the rest of this paper, we represent p i (o j , v i ) as x i = v i , where x i is a variable representing the property p i of object o j . We say that the range of x i is the same as the range of p i . Let X = (x 1 , . . . , x i , . . . , x h ) be the set of variables that describe a state in DS. The mapping from X to objects and their properties is maintained separately.
Alternatively, a state γ is defined as an assignment
Note that a system may satisfy more than one state representations. These state representations are related to each other by refinement relation as we describe below.
Definition 3.5: Description of a state space as illustrated in above example can be very tedious for large systems. In many cases, we want to specify only the variables of interest. We allow a more concise description of a state space in such cases as described below.
Let DS be a data system that can be described by variables x 1 , . . . , x n , where range(x i ) = r i (i = 1, . . . , n). A state space Γ described as (x 1 = v 1 , . . . , x k = v k ) (k ≤ n) represents the following set of states: 
The refinement relation between states spaces is reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric.
Let Σ represent a non empty state space that contains all possible states of data system DS, and P (Σ) be the power set of Σ. The pair (P (Σ), ⊑) is then a partially ordered set. Let Γ and Γ ′ be two elements (state spaces) in P (Σ). The greatest lower bound of Γ and Γ ′ is given as Definition 3.9: (Action) Let ∆ and Γ be two state spaces. An action class A : ∆ → Γ is a state transformer from ∆ to Γ. An action a : δ → γ is an instance of action class A only if δ ∈ ∆ and γ ∈ Γ. We call ∆ as the initial state space and Γ as the final state space for action class A.
In the rest of this paper, for each variable A i of type action class, we assume there exists corresponding initial and final state spaces and we use symbols ∆ i and Γ i to denote them. Definition 3.10: (Monotonicity of Refinement) Let a : ∆ → Γ be an action. Let {δ} and {δ ′ } be state spaces such that ∆ ⊑ {δ} ⊑ {δ 
. , n).
This implies that Γ ⊑ Γ ′ . For better readability we often write Γ ⊑ γ instead of Γ ⊑ {γ} in rest of the paper. Actions are often composed of several other sub-actions. Composition may be performed by following operations: sequence (;), choice (∨), and conjunction (∧). These operators give us the following language for expressing action composition:
where a is an atomic action, and A 1 and A 2 are subactions of A. The precedence order of the operators in action composition is () > ∧ >; > ∨. We now describe properties of these operators.
The choice operator (∨) is a binary operator. If a 1 and a 2 represent two action terms then a 1 ∨ a 2 represents an action a that executes either a 1 or a 2 . The choice operation is commutative and associative.
The sequence operator (;) is also a binary operator. If a 1 and a 2 represent two action terms then a 1 ; a 2 represents an action that performs a 1 followed by a 2 . The sequence operator is not commutative. It is associative and is distributive over the choice operator.
Choice and sequence operators are the basic operators in our action algebra. The conjunction operator is a composite operator. If a 1 and a 2 are two action terms, then a conjunction operation on a 1 and a 2 is defined by a 1 ∧ a 2 = a 1 ; a 2 ∨ a 2 ; a 1 . Conjunction operator is associative, commutative and is distributive over the choice operator.
be actions, and a 1 ⊕ a 2 be an action composition. We say that a 1 ⊕ a 2 is a refinement of a, i.e., a ⊑ a 1 ⊕ a 2 , iff given any states δ ∈ ∆ and γ ∈ Γ, where a(δ) → γ, the action composition (a 1 ⊕ a 2 )(δ) → γ ′ , such that γ ⊑ γ ′ . We assume that the action composition a 1 ⊕ a 2 used as a pattern to refine an action a in our model is alway more restrictive then a. Therefore, it not possible for the refinement process to derive a when further refining the composition a 1 ⊕ a 2 .
Definition 3.12: (Atomic Action) An action a is an atomic action if it cannot be refined by any other action. Definition 3.13: (Action Tree) An action composition tree is a node-labeled binary tree where each internal node is labeled with an action and an operator pair, and each leaf node is labeled with an atomic action. The composition of actions represented by the child nodes is a refinement of the action at the parent node.
In next section, we present types of action compositions that are allowed in this work. To provide assurance about correct compliance checking and policy refinement, action compositions must be wellformed. The concept of well-formed action composition is also discussed in next section.
IV. ACTION COMPOSITION
We first define types of action compositions categorized based on the depth of action tree. Definition 4.1: (Simple Composition) Let a 1 and a 2 be two atomic actions and ⊕ be an action composition operator. An action composition of the form a 1 ⊕ a 2 is called a simple composition.
Definition 4.2: (Complex Composition) Let a 1 and a 2 be two actions and ⊕ be an action composition operator. An action composition a 1 ⊕ a 2 is a complex composition if 1.) a 1 and a 2 are either atomic actions, simple compositions, or complex compositions, and 2.) at least one of a 1 and a 2 is not an atomic action.
An action refinement pattern is a template for refining actions of a particular type. We define additional types of composition in the context of refinement. We categorize action compositions as basic or advanced based on absence or presence of constraints in addition to operator type. Note that the advanced composition type is applicable only when it is required to perform both sub-action. Hence, it is not applicable to choice operations.
Definition 4.4: (Basic Composition) Let a 1 and a 2 be two actions. We say that a ⊑ a 1 ⊕ a 2 is a basic composition if ⊕ is one of the operators: sequence, choice, or conjunction as defined in Section III and there are no additional constraints.
Definition 4.5: (Advanced Composition) Let a 1 and a 2 be two actions, ⊕ be an operator, and ∆ ′ be a state space such that
is an advanced composition if for all states in ∆ ′ the sub action a 2 (or a 1 respectively) can be ignored but for all states in ∆ − ∆ ′ both a 1 and a 2 must be performed.
We also categorize action compositions as strict or flexible based on the feasibility to perform both sub-actions in the initial state space or the feasibility to perform at least one of sub-actions in the initial state space. Strict and flexible action composition types are not applicable for sequence operators as the order of sub-actions is predetermined. Definition 4.6: (Strict Composition) Let a ⊑ a 1 ⊕ s a 2 , where ⊕ s represents a composition operator. We say that a 1 ⊕ s a 2 is a strict composition if ∆ is constrained strictly to satisfy conditions such that both a 1 and a 2 can be performed in the initial state for all δ ∈ ∆. In other words,
Definition 4.7: (Flexible Composition) Let a ⊑ a 1 ⊕a 2 , where ⊕ represents a composition operator. We say that a 1 ⊕a 2 is a flexible composition if for all δ ∈ ∆, it is feasible to perform either a 1 or a 2 in the initial state, and both a 1 and a 2 must be performed. i.e.,
The above composition types may be combined. Figure 2 illustrates possible combinations. Constraints for correct action refinements for various composition types are given in Table II .
Definition 4.8: (Valid Action Trace) Action trace is an action composition where the composition is expressed using only the sequence operator. Given an action tree and an action trace, the trace is valid with respect to the action tree iff the trace can be derived from the root of the action tree using the properties of the operators.
Definition 4.9: (Well-formed Action Composition) Let a ⊑ a 1 ⊕ a 2 be an action composition and let T 1 , . . . , T n represent all the valid traces of the action composition. We say that an action composition is well-formed if and only if for each trace
Advanced and Flexible 
(by transitivity) (3) From (1), a 1 can be performed in the initial state. From (2), a 2 can be performed after a 1 . From (1), (2) and (3), T 1 is a valid action trace. T 1 is a valid trace; therefore, a ⊑ a 1 ; a 2 is well-formed.
Theorem 4.2: Basic and Strict Composition
(by transitivity) (7) From (4), a 1 can be performed in the initial state.
From (4) and (5) 
(Hypothesis) (11) From (8), a 1 can be performed in the initial state. From (9), a 2 can be performed after a 1 . From (8) and (9), T 1 is a valid action trace. From (10), a 2 can be performed in the initial state. From (11), a 1 can be performed after a 2 . From (10) and (11), T 2 is a valid action trace. T 1 and T 2 are valid traces; therefore, a ⊑ a 1 ∧ s a 2 is a well-formed composition. (12) , Initial state δ is in either ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 or both. Therefore, at least one of a 1 and a 2 can be performed. From (13) , There are states in ∆ which provide a choice between a 1 and a 2 . From (12) and (14), T 1 is a valid trace. From (12) and (15) a 2 (δ) ).
Theorem 4.4: Basic and Flexible Composition
a ⊑ a 1 ∨a 2 is well-formed if ∆ 1 ⊔∆ 2 ⊑ ∆, ∆ 1 ⊓∆ = {}, ∆ 2 ⊓ ∆ = {}, Γ ⊑ Γ 1 , and Γ ⊑ Γ 2 . Proof. Initial State Trace Proof steps ∆ ⊑ δ ∆ 1 ⊔ ∆ 2 ⊑ ∆ & ∆ ⊑ δ ⇒ ∆ 1 ⊔ ∆ 2 ⊑ δ (by transitivity) (12) ∆ 1 ⊓ ∆ = {} & ∆ 2 ⊓ ∆ = {} (Hypothesis) (13) ∆ 1 ⊑ δ T 1 = a 1 a 1 (δ) → γ 1 & Γ 1 ⊑ γ 1 (Definition of a 1 ) (14) ∆ 2 ⊑ δ T 2 = a 2 a 2 (γ 1 ) → γ 2 & Γ 2 ⊑ γ 2 (Definition of a 2 ) (15) From, T 2 is a valid trace. T 1 and T 2 are valid traces; therefore, a ⊑ a 1 ∨ a 2 is well-formed. 2 Theorem 4.5: Basic and Flexible Composition a ⊑ a 1 ∧ a 2 is well-formed if ∆ 1 ⊔ ∆ 2 ⊑ ∆, and for all δ∈ ∆ if ∆ 1 ⊑ δ then ∆ 2 ⊑ a 1 (δ) and Γ ⊑ a 2 (a 1 (δ)), and if ∆ 2 ⊑ δ then ∆ 1 ⊑ a 2 (δ) and Γ ⊑ a 1 (
Proof.
Initial State Trace Proof steps
Initial State Trace Proof steps 
(by transitivity) (34) $x) ) be a restricted subclass of class Protect, where $x is an object variable representing objects that satisfy the predicates type($x,Computer), and owner($x,Alice). Composition of a may be described as follows:
[$x((os,Windows))]InstallAntiVirus((target,$x)) This composition is an advanced composition using the conjunction operator. The sub-action InstallAntiVirus must be performed if the operating system is Windows. Otherwise the user may choose not to perform this action.
V. POLICY SPECIFICATION LANGUAGE
In this section we briefly describe our approach to incorporate action refinement in authorization policies. For this we extend the Flexible Authorization Framework (FAF) [5] to express obligations, dispensations, and refinement. FAF is a logic-based framework to express authorization requirements. Access control permissions or denials are derived by a sequence of applications of the authorization rules. These sequence include the propagation, the conflict resolution, the decision, and the integrity modules. In addition, it is ensured that every access request is either granted or denied, therefore ensuring completeness of the authorization policy.
In our work, we provide extension of FAF, while preserving its properties with respect to completeness and decidability. Our extensions, that include predicates to express obligations, dispensations, and refinements in FAF will preserve the properties of locally stratified logic program. First, we give a brief overview of FAF. The FAF syntax is built from constants, variables, and predefined predicates. The constants and variables range over authorization objects, subjects, actions, and roles. FAF includes the following predicates:
• over AO and over AS for overriding predicates • error for integrity viiolations • AOH and ASH for object and subject hierarhies For detailed explanation of these predicates, look at reference [5] . FAF rules are stratified by assigning levels to the predicates and requiring that the head predicate's level is equal or higher than the levels of the predicates in the rule body. Formal properties of FAF, such as unique stable model and well-founded model, as well as complexity analysis, are presented in [5] .
In this work, we propose new predicates to express obligation and dispensation requirements. Table III shows the levels of these predicates along with the original FAF predicates. First, we start with the formal description of these concepts.
Regulations often specify obligations as one of their requirements. In general, we interpret obligations as actions that users are required to perform to achieve specific goals.
Definition 5.1: (Obligation) Let A : ∆ → Γ be an action type. An obligation o = oblig(s, A, q) is defined as a command to subject s to perform an action of type A, such that the condition q is satisfied. Definition of an obligation is said to be correct if Γ ⊓ Γ q = {}, where Γ q is state space representing all states in which q is true. Let δ be the state of a given system. We say that subject s has satisfied obligation O if Γ ⊓ Γ q ⊑ γ. If ∆ ⊑ δ, the assumptions made to perform the action of type A are violated. Violating the assumptions releases the subject from the obligation. As this is not fault of the subject, it is considered to have satisfied the obligation.
Definition 5.2: (Dispensation) Let A : ∆ → Γ be an action type. A dispensation d = disp(s, A) is defined as an exemption given to subject s from performing an action of type A.
Rules in our policy language consists of constants, variables, and predicates. They are defined as follows:
where Obj is the set of objects, T the set of types, U the set of users, G the set of groups, R the set of roles, A the set of action types. 2) Variable Symbols: There are seven sets V o , V t , V u , V g , V r , V a of variable symbols ranging over the sets Obj, T , U, G, R, A, respectively.
3) Predicate Symbols:
a) A 3-ary predicate symbol, hasObligation. The first argument is a subject term, the second argument is an action term, and the third argument is a boolean formula called post-condition. b) A 2-ary predicate symbol, hasDispensation. The first argument is a subject term, and the second argument is an action term. c) A 3-ary predicate symbol, derhasObligation, with the same arguments as hasObligation.
The predicate derhasObligation represents obligations derived by using logical rules of inference (modus ponens plus rules for stratified negation [14] ).
d) A 2-ary predicate symbol, derhasDispensation, with the same arguments as hasDispensation. The predicate derhasDispensation represents dispensations derived by using logical rules of inference (modus ponens plus rules for stratified negation). e) A 3-ary predicate symbol, mustdo, with the same arguments as hasObligation and derhasObligation. It definitely represents the actions that must be performed. Intuitively, mustdo enforces the conflict resolution and obligation policy. In addition, we allow use of cando, dercando, do, done, over AS , over AO , error, hie−, and rel predicates as defined in FAF. Table III 
where s is a subject term, a is an obligation action type, q is a boolean formula composed with relpredicates and done literals, and L 1 & . . . &L n are done, hie-or rel-literals.
Example 5.1: Let us assume that an organization requires computers to have firewall software installed to be considered safe. The obligation "Employees must protect computers they own from unauthorized access" is then modelled by following obligation rule:
where $x, $y, and $s are variables, Protect is a sub-class of Action, Computer and Employee are sub-classes of Object, type is a hie predicate, and target, hasInstalled, and owner are rel predicates.
Let us assume that the data system contains two Employee objects and three Computer objects such that the following predicates hold in the system state:
type(pc1, Computer), type(emp1, Employee) type(pc2, Computer), type(emp2, Employee) type(pc3, Computer), owner(emp1, pc1) owner(emp2, pc2), owner(emp1, pc3) When above obligation rule is evaluated in the data system presented above, the results of evaluations are ($x=pc1,$s=emp1), ($x=pc2,$s=emp2), and ($x=pc3, $s=emp1). Applying the evaluation results to the obligation rule creates following three obligations: hasObligation(emp1, Protect((target,pc1)), hasInstalled(pc1, $y) & type($y,Firewall)) hasObligation(emp2, Protect((target,pc2) New obligations and dispensation may be derived from existing obligations, dispensations, hie-and rel-predicates using inference rules called derivation rules. For example, a derivation rule can specify propagation of obligation via subject hierarchy, and delegation of duties. Definition of dispensation and obligation derivation rules follow. 
A. Policy Refinement
We use derivation rules to refine a high-level policy into low-level policy. Derivation is based on subject hierarchy as in FAF, and action refinement patterns. A discussion of types of derivation rules is presented below. A. Derivation via subject-hierarchy Propagation of obligations and dispensation can be achieved via subject-hierarchy. Dispensation derivation rules expressing propagation via subject-hierarchy may have the following form:
where L 1 & . . . &L n are hasDispensation, derhasDispensation, done, hie-or rel-literals. All derhasDispensation literals appearing in the body must be positive.
Obligation derivation rules expressing propagation via subject-hierarchy may have the following form:
hie-or rel-literals. All derhasObligation literals appearing in the body must be positive.
Example 5.2: Let us assume that a security policy specifies that all employees have an obligation to protect computers they own. A manager is a type of an employee. Hence, managers have an obligation to protect computers they own. This derivation rule is represented as follows:
Derivation via action refinement New obligation rules and dispensation rules may be derived from a high-level obligation or dispensation rule, by substituting the action in high-level rule with its sub-actions as specified in refinement pattern. We now discuss construction of derivation rules based on basic and strict action composition operators.
be an obligation rule, and let a 1 : ∆ 1 → Γ 1 and a 2 : ∆ 2 → Γ 2 be the sub-actions of a : ∆ → Γ. Then the given obligation rule can be refined into obligation rules for sub-actions as described below.
B.1 Distribution over sequence operator
Let a ⊑ a 1 ; a 2 be the refinement pattern for action of type a. An obligation rule to perform action a can be refined into two obligations to perform sub-actions a 1 and a 2 with rules of following form:
We constrain the post-condition of first obligation action a 1 to satisfy pre-conditions required to perform second obligation action a 2 .
B.2 Distribution over choice operator
Let a ⊑ a 1 ∨ a 2 be the refinement pattern for action of type a. Let R be the rule that derives obligation to perform a. We know that if either a 1 or a 2 is performed the obligation is satisfied. Therefore, an obligation rule to perform action a can be refined into either of the following two obligation rules R 1 and R 2 . Application of this refinement pattern to a policy P generates two refined policies P 1 and P 2 . The rule rule R in P is substituted with R 1 and R 2 to generate P 1 and P 2 respectively.
B.3 Distribution over conjunction operator
When an action a is refined by an action composition of form a 1 ∧ a 2 , we refine the policy in two steps. First, we substitute a 1 ∧ a 2 with the composition a 3 ∨ a 4 , where a 3 ⊑ a 1 ; a 2 and a 4 ⊑ a 2 ; a 1 . This allows us to apply action refinement mechanism for choice operator as we described above. In second step, we refine actions a 3 and a 4 in resulting policies using the action refinement mechanism for sequence operator.
B. Deriving Authorizations
Security policies may also contain authorization rules in addition to obligation and dispensation rules. Moreover, the policy refinement mechanism presented in the previous section can be extended by adding rules that derive permissions and prohibitions from predicates defined in obligation specification strata. In this section, we examine authorization rules that may contain obligations and dispensations.
From the perspective of refining a security policy, an obligation to perform an action suggests that the subject must have permission to perform or execute the obligation action.
Definition 5.8: (Authorization Rule) An authorization rule is a rule of the form:
. &L n where s is a subject term, a is a signed action type, sign is either + or -, and L 1 & . . . &L n are mustdo, done, hie-or rel-literals.
Example 5.3: Suppose an obligation decision rule is derived saying that subject s is required to encrypt an object x. To be able to fulfill the obligation s must have permission to execute Encrypt action or function. cando (Encrypt((target,x) ), s, +execute) ← mustdo(s, Encrypt((target,x)), q) Obligation to perform an action can also imply prohibition to perform certain actions. Prohibitions are represented by authorization rules specifying a -sign for the action.
Example 5.4: Suppose subject s has an obligation to encrypt email messages that contain confidential messages. To ensure compliance to this policy rule, the policy-refinement procedure can add a rule disallowing s to send email if its contents are confidential. Such a rule may be expressed as follows:
To perform an obligation action, the subject s may need permissions on objects accessed by the obligation action. Objects that are accessed but not modified are described by instrument property of the class Action. Objects that are accessed and modified by an action are described by resource property of the class Action. An obligation to perform an action can be refined into authorization rules for instrument and resource objects as shown below: cando($r, s, +modify) ← mustdo(s,a,q) & resource(a,$r) cando($i, s, +read) ← mustdo(s,a,q) & instrument(a,$i) Authorization derivation in this framework have definition same as in FAF [5] . It is given below to provide complete description of this framework.
Definition 5.9: (Authorization Derivation Rule) An authorization derivation rule is of the form:
. &L n where o is an object term, s is a subject term, a is an action term, sign is either + or -, and L 1 , . . . , L n are either cando, over, dercando, done, hie-, or rel literals. All dercando-literals appearing in the body of a derivation rule must be positive.
Definition of authorization decision rules in our policy refinement framework is different than that in FAF. FAF uses a closed policy and creates a prohibition for all actions that are not explicitly permitted. However, in policy refinement we assume that the refinement of high-level policy may not generate all the positive authorization rules that may be present in the low-level security policy. We do require that all negative authorization rules generated by policy refinement must be present in the low-level security policy. We assume that the high-level policy does not contain positive authorization rules, and the low-level policy may not override positive authorizations derived from the high-level policy.
Definition 5.10: (Authorization Decision Rule) An authorization decision rule is of the form:
. &L n where o is an object term, s is a subject term, a is an action term, sign is either + or -, and L 1 , . . . , L n are either cando, dercando, done, hie-, or rel literals. To refine the security policy, we first apply the derivation rules to derive all predicates in stratum OS 2 , followed by derivation of all predicates in stratum OS 3 , and so on. We first, evaluate the variables in obligation rules and dispensation rules using the system state. No new predicates can be further derived in this level. Hence, we now apply the decision rules to obtain predicates in higher stratum. Since, both predicates derhasObligation(Alice, InstallFirewall((target, NB1)), true) and derhasDispensation(Alice, InstallFirewall ((target, NB1))) hold, a mustdo predicate for Alice to perform the action InstallFirewall cannot be derived. However, a mustdo predicate for InstallAntiVirus action is derived from the following instance of decision rule: mustdo(Alice, InstallAntiVirus((target, NB1)),true) ← derhasObligation(Alice, InstallAntiVirus((target, NB1)),true) & ¬ derhasDispensation(Alice, InstallAntiVirus((target, NB1)))
VI. COMPLIANCE To check compliance, we compare a high-level security policy with a low-level security policy in context of a data system. The set of do and mustdo ground predicates that can be derived from a security policy and a data system is called ground decision view.
Definition 6.1: (Compliance) A low-level policy P l is compliant to a higher-level policy P h for a given DS, if there exists a (P h , DS) ref , such that (P l , DS) ⇒ (P h , DS) ref , where DS is the data system, (P l , DS) represents the ground decision view of low-level security policy, and (P h , DS) ref represents the ground decision view of refined high-level security policy. We assume that P h does not contain any positive authorization rules Algorithm 1 describes the steps needed to check compliance of a give low-level policy and system state to a given high-level policy. First, the algorithm decision view of low-level security policy. The low-level policy is a stratified logic program and can be evaluated in polynomial time [5] . We then refine the high-level policy. The refinement process can lead to multiple refinements of high-level policies due to action refinement over the choice choice operator (∨) and conjunction operator (∧). The process of refining low-level policies is analogous to a top-down tree traversal, where each internal node of the tree represents the refinement stage at which an action is refined into a composition with choice operator or conjunction operator. The leafs of the tree represent derivation of refined policies with atomic actions. Therefore, the complexity of the policy refinement can be seen as exponential in terms of height of this evaluation tree, which corresponds to number of time action refinement has to be applied to reach atomic actions. Finally, the algorithm checks for compliance by searching for a refinement of high-level policy such that all the access control and obligation requirements specified in the refined policy are satisfied by the low-level policy or current system state.
A given refinement of high-level policy and low-level policy can also be compared to detect conflicts among them. We categorize conflicts between a (high-level) security policy and system state (low-level policy and object properties) into following four categories: Definition 6.2: (Modal Authorization Violations) A modal violation occurs when a high level policy has granted authorization but a low level policy denies authorization. Let R h be a authorization decision rule do(s, o, −a) ← L 1 & . . . &Ł n in refinement of high level policy Algorithm 1: Compliance checking algorithm input : High-level security policy P h , Low-level security policy P l , Data System DS, Refinement Patterns RP, Current State σ output: true if P l and σ are compliant to P h , otherwise false // Generate ground decision view of P l give a data system DS Evaluate the variables in P l . Instantiate the variables in P l to derive ground rules. Apply derivation rules and conflict resolution rules until no new fact is generated. Apply Integrity rules. If errors are found report that policy P l is inconsistent. // Generate all ground decision views of P h given a data system DS // Note that multiple decision views may be derived from P h . Evaluate the variables in P h . repeat
Instantiate the variables in P h to derive ground rules. Apply derivation rules, and conflict resolution rules until no new fact is generated. Apply Integrity rules. If errors are found report that policy P h is inconsistent. until no new fact is generated // Compare ground decision views, which consists of authorization obligation decision views. compliant ← false foreach decision view derived from P h do found ← true // Compare authorization decision views. Let D h be the set of do predicates derived from P h and are applicable in DS and current state σ. Let D l be the set of do predicates derived from P l and are applicable in DS and current state σ.
// Compare obligation decision views Let M h be the set of mustdo predicates derived from P h and are applicable in DS and current state σ. Let M l be the set of mustdo predicates derived from P l and are applicable in DS and current state σ.
(Note that P l may have no means to enforce obligations or P l may not contain obligations. In such cases, we consider M l to be empty and check for satisfaction of obligations in M h .) foreach predicate mustdo(s,a,q) in M h do Let ea be the effect of action a asserted by ontology.
Compute ea by evaluating effect(a, ea) given data system DS if not ((mustdo(s,a,q) 
can be true simultaneously for any system state G.
A modal authorization violation may be modeled with rules of following form:
(Obligation Violations) An obligation violation occurs, when a subject either does not perform his or her obligations or does not perform obligations correctly. Let mustdo(s, a, q) ← L 1 & . . . &L n be an obligation decision rule, where s is a subject, a is an action, q is a post condition, and L 1 & . . . &L n is a precondition. Let e a be an effect of action a asserted by the ontology. When L 1 & . . . &L n holds but e a & q is not satisfied, an obligation violation is indicated.
We assume that prior to the time of compliance checking the subject had sufficient time to perform obligations satisfactorily. Detection of obligation violation may be modeled with rule of following form:
error ← L 1 & . . . &L n & ¬e a & ¬q Definition 6.4: (Resource Capability Conflict) Resource capability conflict occurs when resources required to perform an obligation does not exist.
Let DS = (O, I) be a data system, where O is an ontology and I is set of objects in the system. A resource capability conflict may be modeled with rules of following form:
error ← mustdo(s,a,q) & resource(a,r) & (r ∈ I) Definition 6.5: (Modal Capability Conflict) Modal capability conflict occurs when an obligation requires access to certain resources, and the subject does not have the requisite permissions.
error ← mustdo(s,a,q) & ¬do(a,s,+execute) Theorem 6.1: Obligation and Authorization specification is a locally stratified logic program, thus preserves the desirable properties given in Theorem 1 of [5] . Proof Sketch: Authorization specification language has been extended by introducing new predicates. Table III shows that all atoms in the specification can be assigned a rank such that no atom depends on an atom of greater rank or depends negatively on one on equal or greater rank in any instantiated rule. Proof of this theorem is similar to the proof of Theorem 1 of [5] .
2 We assume that the high-level policy does not contain positive authorization rules. Any authorizations derived from P h must be derived from obligation and derivation rules. If D h ⊆ D l then low-level security policy is prohibiting some users from performing their obligations. This is a case of modal capability conflict and the algorithm correctly returns false.
Obligations derived from the high-level security policy must occur in a compliant low-level policy or the obligations must have been satisfied. If the obligation is satisfied, the obligation postcondition must be true and the effect of obligation action must also be true. The compliance checking algorithm returns false, when both the above conditions are not satisfied.
Theorem 6.2: Compliance checking algorithm (Alg. 1) terminates and the algorithm returns false if low-level security policy and system state is not compliant with the high-level security policy. Proof Sketch: The compliance checking algorithm computes decision view of the high-level and lowlevel policy by evaluating their obligation and authorization specifications, which are locally stratified logic programs. The herbrand base of the obligation and authorization specification is finite. Also, the variables used in the rule head are bounded by the variables in the body of the rule. The policy refinement process performs substitution of rules in the high-level policy until actions can not be further refined. Action refinements in our framework cannot contain loops as the refinement are always more specific. Therefore the number of times action refinement may be performed is finite. We consider a finite DS, thus only a finite number of instantiations may occur; therefore Alg. 1 terminates.
If the low-level security policy violates the high-level security policy, the algorithm detects the violation and returns false. This is proved by contradiction. Let us assume that the low-level security policy P l violates high-level security policy P h and the compliance checking algorithm returns true. The algorithm can return true only if 1) D h ⊆ D l , and 2) for every mustdo(s,a,q) predicate in M h , either mustdo(s,a,q) is in M l or (σ ⇒ q and σ ⇒ e a ). The decision views (P l , DS) and (P h , DS) ref contain only ground mustdo and do predicates. If (σ ⇒ q and σ ⇒ e a ), the obligation a has already been satisfied in P l . As discussed the remainder of mustdo and do predicates also occur in (P h , DS) ref . Hence, the low-level security policy is compliant to high-level security policy. This is in contradiction to initial assumption. 2 VII. CONCLUSIONS In this paper we proposed a framework and techniques to evaluate whether a low-level, implemented security policy is compliant to a high-level policy. Our method uses organizational and security metadata and a set of well-defined operations to generate valid refinements of a given high-level policy. The implemented policy is compared to these refinements to verify whether it is compliant to the high-level policy. The correctness of the compliance is based on the properties of the refinement, that is the wellformedness of the refinement operators and the validity of the compositions.
Although the basic concept presented in this work have been proposed and used in other fields of research and development, e.g., software engineering and programming languages, their relevance for information security have not yet been fully evaluated. Our aim is to build upon these technologies to establish formal properties of security policies. This work constitutes our initial efforts on incorporating results from software refinement [15] , [16] , requirement analysis, and process algebra [17] - [23] in security policy verification. Our ongoing work includes analysis of more complex policy refinements, usage of extensive organizational meta-data, and bottom-up compliance verification. Our goal is to develop methods and tools that will aid and simplify the human evaluation process for compliance checking.
